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The Laws of Air Warfare:
Are There Any? t
Activity has increased within the United Nations recently to reexamine
the laws of war, and to update them to meet the modern conditions of
armed conflict. In a resolution adopted unanimously on 13 January 1969,
UN Res 2444, the General Assembly emphasized the necessity for apply-
ing basic humanitarian principles to all armed conflicts and affirmed the
three principles laid down by the International Committee of the Red
Cross at their Vienna conference in 1965: First, that the rights of the
parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited;
second, that the launching of attacks against the civilian populations as
such is prohibited; and third, that "a distinction must be made between
persons taking part in hostilities and the civilian population with the view
of sparing the latter as much as possible."
The U.N. General Assembly Resolution then invited the Secretary
General, in consultation with the International Committee of the Red
Cross, to study how better to apply the existing laws of war for "the, better
protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants and for the further limita-
tion on certain methods and means of warfare." All states were asked to
ratify the Hague Laws of War Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva
Gas Protocol of 1925, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Pursuant to
that resolution, the Secretary General circulated for comment among mem-
ber stated and international organizations, a report entitled "Respect for
Human Rights in Armed Conflicts."' His report contains a historical sur-
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vey of the existing international agreements pertaining to the laws of war,
urging those stated which have appended reservations to withdraw them.
The Secretary General requested that "special emphasis be placed on
the dissemination of the conventions to military personnel at all levels of
authority, and on the instructions of such persons as to the IR principles
and on the IR application." The observation was made that both juridical
and military experts are needed to study this subject "to achieve, under the
conditions of modern warfare, an adequate comprehension of the full range
of technical and legal problems."
The Secretary General makes no specific plea for a convention regu-
lating air warfare, but he does seem to indict "massive air bombing" by
noting that, in some cases, this type of warfare has contributed to a very
broad interpretation of what constitutes a permissible military objective.
He states that strategic bombing has, in some instances, been used for
intimidating, demoralizing and terrorizing civilians "by inflicting in-
discriminate destruction upon densely populated areas." In the replies to
the report, only Finland specifically adverted to the need for a codification
of the laws of air warfare.
U.N. resolution 2444 was the result of a UNESCO Conference on
Human Rights in Teheran in April of 1968. There, a resolution was
adopted by the Conference with only one abstention and no votes against.
It was couched in stronger terms than those later used in U.N. Resolution
2444, referring to the widespread violence and brutality of our times,
including "massacres, summary executions, tortures, inhuman treatment of
prisoners, killing of civilians in armed conflicts and the use of chemical and
biological means of warfare including napalm bombing." 2
With the background of U.N. Resolution 2444 and the Teheran declara-
tion, the ICRC expanded its scope of studies to include the application of
the laws of war to the conduct of hostilities. A committee of experts of the
ICRC convened in February, 1969, and formulated a report entitled
"Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in
Armed Conflicts."3 It is the most authoritative treatment of the laws of war
since World War II. It was the culmination of their observations made
during the last 20 years of perennial armed conflicts, especially in Korea,
the Middle East, Vietnam and the Yemen.
The tempo continues to increase for insuring respect for human rights in
2 Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights Resolution, XXIII, Te-
heran, April-May, 1968.3 International Committee of the Red Cross, Report of Experts, Prepared for Presenta-
tion to the 2 1st International Conference of the Red Cross at Istanbul, Turkey, in September,
1969.
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armed conflicts. On September 18, 1970, the Secretary General issued a
supplemental report on the subject.4 Shortly thereafter, on December 9,
1970, the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted UN Res 2675 en-
titled "Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed
Conflicts."'5 Essentially, these basic principles were designed to separate
out the civilian population from those "actively taking part in the hostil-
ities" so that the former might be spared. Of particular interest were two
fundamental principles which were specific in application. "Dwellings and
other installations that are used only by civilian populations"; and "Places
or areas designated for the sole protection of civilians, such as hospital
zones or similar refuges" should not be "the object of military operations."
The other six principles were more in the nature of general admonitions to
spare the civilian populations as much as possible and to distinguish them
from combatants.
This increased emphasis to the regulation of armed conflict by the ICRC
as well as the U.N. General Assembly makes it imperative for air planners
and flyers to know their rights and duties under the laws of war.
There is no dearth of opinion that in the matter of air warfare there are,
in fact, no positive rules. Air Marshall Harris, the noted chief of the British
Bomber Command in World War II, wrote shortly after its conclusion: "In
the matter of the use of aircraft in war, there is, it so happens, no in-
ternational law at all. ' 6 This view has been echoed in more recent times by
well-known international lawyers who have specialized in studies on the
laws of war. "In no sense but a rhetorical one," wrote Professor Stone in
1955, "can there still be said to have emerged a body of intelligible rules of
air warfare comparable to the traditional rules of land and sea warfare." 7
Professor Levie labeled the nonexistence of a code governing the use of
airpower in armed conflict one of the major inadequacies in the existing
laws of war." While the view of Air Marshall Harris reflects a certain
hopeless attitude toward any attempt to regulate this important form of
warfare, the views of Professors Stone and Levie reflect pleas to focus
effort on its regulation and clarification.'
In view of the very substantial role of air power in modern armed
conflicts and the history of how this role has increased from World War I
4Supplemental Report of the Secretary General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts A/8052, 18 September 1970.
5UN GA Res 2675 (XXV) 109 in favor, none against, 8 abstentions.
6Harris, Bomber Offensive 177 (1947).7Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflicts 609 (1959).
8Levie, Report to the New York Bar Association, Major Inadequacies in the Existing
Laws ofArmed Conflict (1970).
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to Vietnam, it is surprising to reflect that only three provisions of in-
ternational legislation ever came into force with the specific view of regu-
lating air operations in wartime. The first of these was the 1899 balloon
declaration adopted in plenary session at the First Hague Peace Confer-
ence without debate. It provided simply that "The Contracting Powers
agree to prohibit, for a term of five years, the launching of projectiles and
explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature."
The declaration was proposed by the Russian delegate and supported by a
remarkably prescient Dutch delegate who stated that "the progress of
science ... has been such that things hitherto beyond belief are realized
today. We can foresee the use of projectiles or other things filled with
deleterious gases, soporific, which, dropped from balloons in the midst of
troops, would at once put them out of commission." 9 The first balloon
declaration expired by its terms in 1904, but at the Second Hague Peace
Conference in 1907 the Russian delegation proposed its renewal. By this
time, however, aircraft were looked upon no more as "too imperfect to be
of any practical use in warfare"' 10 and the adoption of the second balloon
declaration was far from unanimous." The 1907 balloon declaration was to
remain in force until the close of the projected third Peace Conference,
intended to be held in 1915, but yet to be called. Like the first declaration,
the second was only in force in a war exclusively between contracting
parties. Since France, Spain and Russia, among others, did not adopt it,
and Germany only on condition all other parties to the Conference would
sign, it obviously never fulfilled its intended legal effect.
The third provision of conventional law specifically framed to regulate
air warfare, is article 25 of the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the laws
and customs of war on land (H.C. IV). That article provides, "The attack
or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings which are undefended is prohibited." The negotiating record
shows that the words, "by whatever means," were inserted specifically, to
regulate bombing attacks by air. It has been frequently referred to as a
basis for seeking to limit the air operations of belligerents, and for protest-
ing the declared illegal air activity of an enemy. However, undefended
cities, in the historic sense, meant only those in the immediate zone of
ground operations which could be seized and occupied by advancing
ground forces without the use of force. In this sense the concept of the
undefended locality has proved as empty in air combat as the balloon
9Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, vol. 1, p. 659-660.
1Lawrence, Principles of International Law, p. 527.
1129 States for (Germany on condition of unanimity); 6 against (France and Russia
included); 10 States did not vote. Scott, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 652.
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declarations. These three provisions, so utterly ignored in the use of air-
power by belligerents, are the total sum of formal rules ever agreed to by
any states on the conduct of hostilities from the airspace.
One official and ambitious attempt was made to codify the laws of air
warfare after World War I. At the Washington Conference on the Limita-
tion of Armaments in 1921, a resolution was unanimously approved by the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan which called
for a commission of jurists to convene at the Hague to study the subject.
Legal experts from those countries and the Netherlands met there from
December, 1922 to February, 1923, and framed an all-embracing codifica-
tion of the subject intended to be a compromise between the "necessities of
war and the requirements of the standards of civilization. '1 2 The Hague air
rules were never ratified even by the parties to the Conference. They do
reflect the only authoritative attempt to set down concisely the rules for air
combat. Prior to World War II, certain nations did indicate their intent to
adhere to these rules, notably Japan in 1938 in their China campaign, but
by World War II their influence was minimal.
This paucity of conventional rules has left airmen stranded for authorita-
tive and practical guidance. It is true that the airman is subject to the
general laws of war to the same general extent as the sailor and the soldier,
but where does he look for special rules governing his air activity? The
British Manual ofAir Force Law dispensed with any effort to formulate air
warfare rules, by stating in a footnote that in the absence of general
agreement, it was impossible to include in that manual a chapter on air
warfare.' 3 The authoritative U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 27-10, July
1956) on the law of land warfare, apart from references contained in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, respecting the status of aircrews as prison-
ers of war and medical aircraft, refers to air activities in time of armed
conflict in only four instances, certainly a very meagre source of guidance
for the inquiring airman when one notes the extensive scope of intended
guidance of the draft Hague Air Rules of 1923. The latter embraces
subjects as to the marking of aircraft, aerial bombardment, the use of
incendiary explosive bullets, the status of neutral, and of enemy, civil
aircraft and of combatant and civil air crews. Yet, today's U.S. Air Force
crewman, about to enter a combat theater, is still referred officially to the
Army Field Manual for official instruction. In a similar vein, the Swiss
Army Manual provides that "Air warfare is not a special category; in so far
12 From the Rappoteur's Summary, International Law and Some Current Illusions (J. P.
Moore, Rep. 1924).
13 British Manual ofAir Force Law 2 (1944).
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as aerial operations aim at terrestial objectives they are subject, in prin-
ciple, to the rules of war on land, but only to the extent that the vector of
the aerial weapons does not require special rules." 14
The U.S. Air Force did undertake the task of drafting guidance on the
subject of air warfare in 1956. After four years of research, a draft manual
on the subject was finalized. However, the decision to release it for publica-
tion has never been made. The draft Air Force manual has been made
available to the students of the Air Force Academy and the Air War
College for research and discussion purposes. Because of its unofficial
nature, however, it has not been available to aircrews and air planners. Its
influence even within the U.S. Air Force is relatively slight.
As the world's greatest air power, as the most effective user of the
airspace for combat operations, why has the United States held back in the
promulgation of a complete set of rules regulating air warfare? Certainly it
is not because of any incompatibility with the U.N. Charter. The Charter
itself provides that "in order for the UN to take urgent military measures,
Members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for
combined international enforcement action." 15 The Charter provides the
Security Council with authority to take such action by air, as well as by
land and sea forces, as necessary to maintain or restore the peace.' 6
Obviously, any codification of the laws of air warfare are compatible with
the provisions of the U.N. Charter as well as being extremely suited to the
times when the Secretary General, the General Assembly, and the ICRC
are seeking more effective means of protecting the civilian populations
from the ravages of armed conflict. However, three fundamental dilemmas
confront the effective codification of air rules, and may, in some degree,
have influenced our own Air Force in refraining from taking the lead in this
subject. The Air Force cannot, no more than could the Commission of
Jurists at the Hague in 1923, fully lay down effective rules of air combat
without a certain concordance among the major air powers as to how to
resolve them. The first of these dilemmas is the permissible scope of the
military objective. Inherent in this problem is whether, in air warfare, there
is any realistic distinction to be made between combatants and noncom-
batants. Also, whether there is a middle category, the so-called
quasi-combatant, which comprises either the industrial or auxiliary work
force of the enemy within the permissible limits of the military objective.
For example, is the Vietnamese hamlet, which bristles with the small and
heavy armaments of the enemy, to be compared with the Abbey of Monte
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Cassino in World War II? Is the village which feeds, supports and shelters
the Viet Cong to be equated to the large industrial cities of the Ruhr Basin
in World War II?
U.N. Resolution 2444 stated that the civilian population should not be
the object of attack as such. But what constitutes the legitimate, immune
part of that population remains ill defined. Further, are civilians the direct
object of attack when vital industrial and strategic targets are in the imme-
diate vicinity; and how much incidental bombing of civilians in industrial
areas or Viet Cong strongholds transfer the true civilian segment from the
indirect-object category to the direct-object one? The late Professor John
Cobb Cooper, in a lecture to the Naval War College in 1948, termed the
definition of the military objective and the bombing of the civilian popu-
lation the most crucial issue confronting any attempt to regulate this sub-
ject. The Secretary General does recommend an alternative to arriving at
an acceptable and agreed-upon definition of the military objective. This
would be an enlargement of the concept of safety or protected zones to
include specified areas where women, children, elderly, and sick could be
located with immunity from air attack. Such areas would contain no objec-
tives of military significance, nor be used for any military purpose. They
would have to be marked specially and clearly to be visible from the air.17
To be effective, there would have to be an adequate system of control
and verification of these zones. This verification would be carried out
either by some independent agency as the ICRC or by one or more
nonbelligerent nations acting in the capacity of a protecting power. 18 There
is ample precedent 19 for the creation of such protected areas (in the 1949
Geneva Conventions). The sick and wounded, and the civilian Geneva
Conventions contain as annexes, draft agreements, hopefully to be signed
by potential belligerents before the outbreak of hostilities, which provide
for their establishment. It is specified that such zones are to comprise only
a small part of the belligerent's territory, that they be thinly populated, and
that they be removed and free from all military objectives or large in-
dustrial or administrative establishments. They may not be defended by
military means (which includes the use of antiaircraft weapons, tactical
fighter aircraft or guided weapons).
It seems to the writer that a concept of protected zones, incorporating a
broader category of the civilian population to be sheltered, is indeed an
alternative to the concept of the undefended town or the open city which
"See paras. 45-87, Secy. Gen. Report A/8052, 18 Sept. 1970.
18A/7720, note 2, supra at 49, 50.
'
9Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
the Field (TIAS 3362); and Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians (TIAS 3365).
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has not found favor in actual practice. 20 There are some who do not believe
the establishment of safety zones for potentially large segments of the
civilian population is practicable. To be effective, it is thought that these
zones would require thousands of square miles which would create in-
surmountable logistics problems and inevitably cause the areas to be used
unlawfully for military advantages. 21
However, the immunized areas need not be so broad. If one grants that
the industrial work centre, for those actively engaged in work directly
sustaining the war effort, or the village hamlet used as a military support
base, really have no entitlement to immunity, the physical breadth of the
protected areas visibly diminishes. 22 As a realistic alternative to the elusive
and vague scope of the military objective, who can deny their greater
aptitude for understandable delimitations to air combat?
The Hague commission of jurists' definition of the military objective is a
case in point. Military forces; military works; military establishments or
depots; factories engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition, or
distinctively military supplies; lines of communication or transportation
used for military purposes, only, could be bombed from the air under those
Rules. This was hardly broad enough to cover the enemy's marshalling
yards, his industrial centers, his shipping facilities and his means of com-
munication. Moreover, air bombardment of cities, towns and villages not
in the immediate neighborhood of ground operations was prohibited. 23
This proved too limited when such cities and towns, far removed from the
ground action, were known to be vital to the enemy's war effort. The
totality of World War II saw both the Allies and the Axis expand consid-
erably on the military objective. The German Luftwaffe destroyed War-
saw, Rotterdam and Coventry by air very early in the war.
The first thousand-bomber raid of the war was launched by the British
on Cologne the night of 30 May 1942, and destroyed 12 percent of the
city's industrial and residential sections and caused 5,000 casualties. 24 It
set the tone for the whole British night-bomber offensive against the Third
Reich: the concept that area bombing of important industrial centers was
best suited to bring Germany to her knees. U.S. forces, with their superior
2 0As to the inaptness of the term "undefended" to immunize towns, villages, dwellings
from air attack, see Stone, Legal Controls of Armed Conflict (1959) 623. For a like view that
an "open city" has little applicability in air warfare, see Jennings, Open Towns 22 BRIT. Y. B.
INT'L. L. 258.21See Levie, op. cit. supra note 8 at 45.22Perhaps the workers in a large industrialized centre, do recapture their immunity
temporarily when they disperse to residential suburbs; but the hamlet held by and supporting
the enemy keeps the civilians living there ever exposed to attack.
23Hague Rules of Air Warfare Article 24(2) (1963).
24 See 28 Air Force Magazine 34 (1945).
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navigational aids, did seek to confine their targets to individually selected
and identified factories, oil refineries, industrial plants, and shipyards in
Europe; but in the Far East, Tokyo and Yokohama were saturated with
explosive and fire bombs because of the Japanese shadow industries, the
war production and parts-making conducted in the individual home.
The first night air raid by U.S. superfortresses in the Far East occurred
on 9 March 1945 over Tokyo, and it is reported that 280 of these bombers
destroyed several square miles of the center of the city. In the Korean
conflict, precision bombing was again emphasized by the Air Forces (most-
ly U.S.) of the U.N. Command. The repair ships, dock yards, and military
warehouses of North Korea were bombed without too much damage to the
surrounding city. In the Vietnamese conflict, again, area or saturation
bombing has been reintroduced, this time to penetrate the vast jungle
canopy which serves as a protective layer of the network of Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese storage areas, communication and transportation com-
plexes and command posts. And in preselecting air targets, proximity to
ground operations is not even remotely a factor.
The Secretary of Defense recently termed U.S. air strikes in the North
"limited duration protective reaction air strikes" against North Vietnamese
missile and antiaircraft gun positions "in response to attacks on our
unarmed reconnaissance aircraft."125 On the other hand, the North Viet-
namese continue to charge that U.S. aircraft have been attacking densely
populated areas of the North such as Haiphong, Quanh Ninh, Ha Tay, and
Hoa Binh killing a considerable number of North Vietnamese civilians. 26
And a U.S. Congressman fresh from a tour of Southeast Asia reports his
belief that a large number, "perhaps thousands," of villages may have been
destroyed by American Air Power in 1968 and 1969.27 It must be left to
the historians, at a time when careful factual inquiry is possible, to record
to what extent the civilian population and their hamlets and villages have
been destroyed by spill-over air attacks, or because they harbored military
objectives. The Defense position has been repeatedly and clearly stated
that "No US aircraft have been ordered to strike any civilian targets in
North Vietnam at any time. United States policy is to target military
targets only. There has been no deviation from this policy. All reasonable
care is taken to avoid civilian casualties .... No dikes have been targeted
in North Vietnam, in Nam Dinh or elsewhere and we have no knowledge
that any pilot has disobeyed his orders." 28
25Akron Beacon Journal 21 November 1970, page 1.
261d.
27Akron Beacon Jouranl 19 April 1970, page 5.28Report of Sec. McNamara to House Armed Services Committee Feb. 1966 reported in
10 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 428.
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It is an inevitable outgrowth of U.S. air strikes, however, that com-
parisons are made in today's press between the My Lai incident, the trial
and conviction of Lt. Calley for premeditated murder under Article 118 of
the UCMJ, and the deaths and injuries which air bombing brings. One
correspondent distinguished the area bombing of industrialized cities in an
all-out confrontation, such as World War 11, which may in his view be
permissible, from a conflict in which a technologically advanced nation
such as the U.S. becomes immersed in an armed conflict involving a fairly
primitive, agricultural-based country. In the latter type of conflict, it is
argued incidental casualties to civilians from the air is more akin to the
charges directed at Lt. Calley and other ground troops similarly charged.29
Both the charter for the trial of major war criminals for Europe and for
the Far East define the wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity, as a war crime, and in-
humane acts committed against the civilian population as a crime against
humanity.30 Several high German Air Force officers were indicted for war
crimes, notably Field Marshall Goering, and Generals Milch and Speidel.
However, none was tried for his part in air operations.31 It has been argued
ably that the situation existed because both sides had equally participated
in such attacks from the air, and therefore trial of Axis and Japanese
leaders on this charge was inappropriate.32 But it must be conceded that
failure to indict any officers for air campaigns reflected the fact there
were no clear cut delimitations of the military objective on which to base a
violation. As Professor Cooper observed, the concept was too vague.
The ICRC has drawn a distinction between occupation or tactical bom-
bardments and strategic ones. In the former category are those air raids
closely allied to ground fighting. The experts suggested the institution of
open and immune localities for the protection of civilians. In strategic
bombardments, the experts believed the military objective must be
sufficiently identified by the attacking force, and that any loss of civilian life
must be proportionate to the military advantage to be secured. Whenever
the principle of proportionality might be violated, the combatant should
refrain from attack.33 The experts failed, however, adequately to define
what constitutes a military objective, just as did the Hague Commission of
Jurists.
29See Sheehan, Should We have War Crimes Trials?, Akron Beacon Journal March 13,
1971.30Articles of the International Military Tribunal, Established by the London Agreement
Article 6. A similar Tribunal was Established in the Far East.31The Einsatz-Gruppen case, 15 Law Reports of the Minor War Crimes Tribunals 114,
115 (1947).32Trial of the Major War Criminal Tribunals, 337 (1947).33Report of the ICRC Experts, note 6, supra, at 44.
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They do not consider strategic area bombing a premissible form of
combat. They cite the proposition that to "attack without distinction, as a
single objective, an area including several military objectives at a distance
from one another is forbidden whenever elements of the civilian population
or dwellings, are situated in between." In a similar vein, the Secretary
General's supplemental report on respect for human rights in armed
conflicts provides that "consideration might be given to the specific prohi-
bition of the use of 'saturation' bombing as a means of intimidating, de-
moralizing and terrorizing civilians by inflicting indiscriminate destruction
upon densely populated areas." '3 4
While neither the Red Cross nor the Secretary General condones area
bombing, belligerents are not likely to forego a valuable strategic option for
air attacks which has proved so helpful in securing a more favorable and
quicker termination of the conflict. Like the philosophy of defining the
military objective exclusively, formulations which leave the military in-
capable of accomplishing its assignments are certain to be ignored, Hence,
the wide divergence between the expression of hopes of experts and the
actual practices of belligerents.
A more realistic and forceful distinction is made by Professor Telford
Taylor in his recent book, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Trage-
dy. It is one thing, writes Professor Taylor, for the U.S. pilot to have
bombed large industrialized areas in World War II to cripple the enemy's
war-making capability. Although it was inevitable the civilian population
would be harmed, the high-flying pilot could not distinguish within the
industrialized centres between the war-making facilities and the civilian
population therein. Quite another circumstance, writes the Professor, for
the demarcation of large free strike (air) zones suspected of guerilla activ-
ity, where after the zone is cleared of friendly troops and civilians, tactical
air strikes and "squirrel hunting" by small planes and helicopters is in-
stituted. "This is using the aircraft for the same purpose that the in-
fantryman uses his gun, and the pilot ought to be held to the same stan-
dards of distinguishing combatants from noncombatants. '3 5 It remains to
be seen, however, whether even this logical delineation between the strate-
gic and the tactical use of air power will stand up to the military necessities
demanded by a belligerent whose air power constitutes her most effective
deterrent to the infiltrations and jungle tactics of a powerful foe.
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property does
34 Para. 42, Report of the Secretary General A/8052, 18 September 1970.
a5Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (1970), p. 142 et seq.
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provide a useful and realistic middle ground. 36 This convention is the
product of an intergovernmental conference convened at the Hague in
1954. Whereas the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are for the protection of
persons, the 1954 Hague Convention preserves cultural property. It is of
special significance to airmen for several reasons. First, it equates "large
industrial centers" to "military objectives," by providing that places of
refuge for movable cultural property must be placed at an adequate dis-
tance from either. Second, it broadens the concept of the military objective
by providing that this term includes, by way of example, airports, broad-
casting stations, establishments engaged in work of national defense, ports,
railway stations of relative importance, and main lines of communication.
Third, it recognizes that the principle of imperative military necessity
deprives cultural property of its protection. Finally, it stipulates that in no
event shall property be the subject of reprisal raids.
All of these are important realistic principles fully applicable to air
combat. The use of places of refuge, clearly marked and identified for the
protection of cultural property, could be the beginning of a wedge to
increase the number of objects and buildings to be immunized; just as the
extension of hospital, safety or neutralized zones is the opening to increase
the areas for the protection of civilians. Certainly the establishment of
safety zones for property and people is compatible with area as well as
precision bombing techniques. Neither concept requires the destruction of
identified protected areas placed at an adequate distance from large in-
dustrial centers, places of military encampment and dangerous militarized
areas as armed villages supporting the enemy.
The second dilemma inhibiting the development of the laws of air war-
fare centers around the choice of weapons which may be employed. The
historic St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 which prohibited the use of
explosive, fulminating, or inflammable substances in bullets has no appli-
cation to air warfare. The use of such bullets in air war is for the purpose37
of destroying aircraft and the enemy's resources on the ground and in the
air, not primarily for the purpose of injuring enemy personnel. For the
same reason, the old Hague Declaration of 1899 prohibiting the use of
expanding bullets has not been extended to air operations. There are,
however, three general areas where the type of weapon employed has
evoked particular controversy with respect to aircraft.
36Convention of The Hague of The Protection of Cultural Property in Event of Armed
Conflicts (14 May 1954), reported in the ICRC Expert Report in Annex 5, at N16. At the
time of this writing the United States is not a party, but it is expected that it will be.37But see Spaight, Air Power and War Rights 198 (1947). The Declaration of St.
Petersburg is reproduced in the ICRC Expert Report as Annex 1.
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First, is the use of atomic weapons. There is substantial legal opinion
that such weapons are unlawful. This view has been reflected by U.N.
Resolution 1653 (XVI) which specifically provides that "Any state using
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the
Charter of the United Nations, acting contrary to the laws of humanity and
as committing a crime against mankind and civilization." The Secretary
General notes, however, that the legal effect of this resolution is subject to
question because of the divided vote, 55 for, 20 against, and 26 absten-
tions. The ICRC experts were divided on how best to handle the question
of nuclear use.
They were unanimous that such weapons were incompatible with the
expressed aim of the Hague Conventions to reduce unnecessary suffering.
The present U.S. view as expressed in the U.S. Army Field Manual on the
laws of war is clear. The use of "Explosive 'atomic weapons' whether by
air, land, or sea" does not violate international law in the absence of any
customary rule or international convention. 38 The Red Cross also gave
tacit recognition to this viewpoint at Vienna in 1965, by providing that the
"General principles of the laws of war apply to nuclear and similar weap-
ons."
39
It must not be forgotten, however, that there is strong legal authority
denying the lawfulness of the atomic bomb. "While target-area bombing
comes close to the border line of permissibility," wrote Spaight shortly
after World War II, "atom bombing definitely oversteps it."'40 And in the
only published case discussing its legality, that concerning the claim of five
Japanese for injuries sustained at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a Japanese
District Court was of the view that such bombing violated both customary
law, in that it was necessarily indiscriminate, and treaty law, in that its
blast and radioactive effect violated the Hague Regulations of 1907 against
the use of poisons and poisoned arms as well as the Geneva Protocol of
1925. 41
The second general area arousing controversy relates to the use of fire
weapons and specifically napalm. Again, the official U.S. position, as
reflected in our Army Field Manual, is that their employment against
targets requiring their use is not in violation of international law, with the
38U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 27-10) at 18.39 1CRC Resolution XXVIII, Vienna 1965, XXth Conference of ICRC.4 0Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3 ed., 1947) 276; see also Greenspan, The
Modern Law of Land Warfare (1959) 368, and Stone, Legal Controls of International
Conflict (1959) 342.41The Shimoda Case, digested 58 AJIL 1016 and commented on 59 AJIL 759; cf.
O'Brien, Limited Nuclear Warfare, 8 Military Law Review 162; Singh, Nuclear Weapons
and International Law (1959).
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caveat that they are not to be used in a way to cause unnecessary suffering
to individuals. 42 This view is in opposition to the Teheran resolution of
May, 1968 which expressly condemned napalm bombing. Some ICRC
experts viewed the use of incendiaries as prohibited by the Geneva Proto-
col of 1925 because of its asphyxiating effects, while others considered it
was the use to which incendiaries were put which determined its lawful-
ness. 43 U.N. Resolution 2444 does not specifically condemn the use of
incendiaries, including napalm, but the Secretary General states that
regulation of its use clearly needs an agreement. Certainly, the extensive
resort to incendiaries in World War II, Korea and Vietnam has demon-
strated the military efficacy of this weapon. It is reasonable to conclude
that only by special international agreement will its use ever be regulated.
The third area of general uncertainty relates to the use of weapons
calculated to affect the enemy through his senses (including his skin), the
use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Included in this category are
the use of noninjurious agents such as tear gas and also the use of herbi-
cides and defoliants. All of these possible means of warfare center around
the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 and its precise compass. The Protocol
prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all
analogous liquids, materials, or devices and, further, the use of bacterio-
logical methods of warfare. More than 65 States are formally bound by this
agreement.
In 1966 the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution by 91 in favor,
none against, and four abstentions, that called for the strict observance of
the Protocol by all States and asked those members who had not done so
to ratify it.44 No one is against this Protocol, but its correct interpretation
finds nations 'in disagreement. Some believe the use of incendiaries and
napalm are prohibited under the Protocol, many believe that riot-control
agents, such as tear gas, may not be employed, and there is a strong view
that even herbicides fall within its purview. The U.S. position on these
various views was stated by the President and the Secretary of State earlier
last year. On 19 August the President, in submitting the Protocol to the
U.S. Senate, stated that "The U.S. has renounced the first use of lethal and
incapacitating chemical weapons and renounced any use of biological or
toxic weapons." 45 The Secreatry of State noted that the Protocol had been
42U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 27-10) at 18.
43Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiat-
ing, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, reprinted in the
ICRC Expert Report as Annex 3.
"United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2163 (XXI), 5 Dec. 1966.
"President Nixon's Message in LXIII Dep't State Bull. 273, September, 1970.
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observed in almost all armed conflicts since 1925, and that the United
States' understanding was that the Protocol did not prohibit the use in war
of riot-control agents and chemical herbicides; and further, that smoke,
flame, and napalm are not covered by the Protocol's general prohibition. 46
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is showing considerable reluc-
tance to recommend ratification of the Pact with this interpretation. Sena-
tor Fulbright and others have stated that by insisting that herbicides and
riot-control agents are not banned by the Protocol and would still be used
in Vietnam, all the advantage of ratifying the Treaty would be lost. (Wash-
ington Post, March 23.) Unless the executive branch revises its under-
standing of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to include herbicides and tear
gas, it is doubtful the Senate will give advice and consent to the Protocol's
ratification.
The third dilemma concerns the status of the aircrewman. Here is a
problem of the enforcement of clearly defined rules rather than the devel-
opment of new ones. The fallen airman poses problems of growing concern
as he seems to be singled out for mistreatment or unauthorized public
display with increasing frequency. Both the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907 respecting land warfare contained provisions that members of the
armed forces were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. Of course, this
included all members, whether combatants on land, sea, or in the airspace.
Early in World War I there was some question as to the enemy airman's
status, but no case appeared in which they were denied prisoner-of-war
status. In World War II, however, the concept began to be advanced by
some that airmen, unlike their brothers in arms on land and at sea, were not
necessarily entitled to be treated humanely. In 1943, Himmler ordered all
senior SS and police officers not to interfere between German civilians and
English and United States flyers who bailed out of their aircraft. In 1944
Hitler ordered allied aircrews shot without trial whenever such aircrews
had attacked German pilots of aircrews in distress, attacked railway trains
or strafed individual civilians or vehicles. Goebbels referred to Allied
airmen as murderers and stated that it was "hardly possible and tolerable
to use German police and soldiers against the German people when the
people treat murderers of children as they deserve." 47
Although captured Allied airmen were largely accorded prisoners-of-war
status by German authorities, there is enough evidence of mistreatment in
the reports of the trials of the major and minor war criminals in Europe to
461d.
47 For the Views of the Axis Leaders on the status of downed Allied Airmen, see 26
Reports of the Trial of Major War Criminals 275; 27 id. at 246; and 38 id. at 314 (1949).
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reflect the beginnings of what could be a disturbing precedent. In the Far
East, Allied airmen also suffered from deprivation of their prisoner-of-war
status.
Two of the U.S. aircrews which participated in the famous Doolittle air
raids on Tokyo and Nagoya from the U.S. naval carrier Hornet were
captured by Japanese troops when they made forced landings in mainland
China. At the time of their capture, there was no Japanese law under which
they could be punished. This was remedied four months after their capture
by the passage of the Enemy Airmen's Act of Japan. This act made it a war
crime to participate in an air attack upon civilians or private property, or
conduct air operations in violation of the laws of war. The law was made
retroactive to cover those U.S. airmen already in their hands. In October,
1942, two months after the passage of the Enemy Airmen's Act, three of
the Doolittle raiders were sentenced and executed. The Judgment of the
International Tribunal for the Far East reflects many instances thereafter
in which captured Allied airmen were tortured, decapitated and even delib-
erately burned to death. 48
The Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tri-
bunals expressly make it a war crime to murder or ill-treat prisoners-
of-war. Both General Keitel of the German Army General Staff and
Kaltenbrunner of the Gestapo were charged with, and convicted of mis-
treating POWs, in part, it appears, for their role in the mistreatment of
captured Allied airmen. 49
However, in the trial of Japanese judges, Japanese judicial and prison
officials were convicted on a different basis. The thrust of the holdings of
the War Crimes Commissions in these cases was that the U.S. airmen were
deprived of a fair trial and not that U.S. airmen, as lawful combatants, were
entitled to POW status. The 1949 Geneva Convention on POWs con-
firmed the entitlement of aircrew members to the benefits of that Con-
vention including "civilian members of military-aircrews" and "crews of
civil aircraft." Article 85 provides that prisoners-of-war prosecuted under
the laws of the detaining power for acts committed prior to capture shall
retain, even if convicted, the benefits of that Convention. Compliance with
these provisions would prevent the denial of POW status to airmen, even
those convicted during hostilities under such laws as the Japanese Enemy
Airman Act.
Unfortunately, most of the Communist-bloc countries have entered
4 8See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Chapter V III, at
1025 (1948).49Trial of the Major War Criminals 289-92.
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reservations to article 85. The reservation of the North Korean Govern-
ment is typical. They refused to be bound to provide POW status to
individuals convicted under local law of war crimes based on the principles
of Nuremberg and the Tokyo Far East International Military Tribunal.
The Government of China and the North Vietnamese reservations are
similar. There are many cases of mistreatment of U.S. airmen in the
Korean conflict, and the extortion from U.S. airmen of false germ warfare
confessions for propaganda purposes, and publicly parading them through
the streets under humiliating circumstances, is well known. Although all
captured U.N. Forces suffered to some extent under the fairly primitive
conditions of confinement which existed, it was the airman who was sin-
gled out especially for public degradation, exposure to the press, and the
forcing of confessions of illegal conduct.
The fate of all prisoners of war held by the North Vietnamese is of
present great concern because of the refusal of that Government to consid-
er the 1949 Geneva Convention applicable to that conflict. Of interest to
this discussion, however, is the particular light in which they consider
captured U.S. airmen. A Hanoi press release with a date line of 10 July
1966 could well be expected to reflect their official attitude on this issue. A
North Vietnamese lawyer writes that U.S. pilots are not prisoners-of-war
but criminals, that air raids on densely populated areas in South Vietnam
and on pagodas and hospitals in both the South and the North were
conducted by B-52 bombers, and are concrete war crimes under paragraph
6(b) of the Nuremberg War Crimes Charter. He also cites the bombing and
strafing of the dike system and other irrigation works and densely popu-
lated cities such as Hanoi and Haiphong as war crimes. (There is a striking
parallel between this reference to the dike systems and irrigation works and
Article 17 of the ICRC Rules for the Protection of Civilians. Article 17
invites the States concerned to agree on the immunity from destruction "of
engineering works or installations-such as hydroelectric dams, nuclear
power stations or dikes" which might, if attacked, endanger the civilian
population "through the releasing of natural or artificial forces." 5 0 This
view apparently shared by the North Vietnamese lawyer and the drafters
of the ICRC Rules is a substantial departure from practices in World War
I1 where dikes and dams as well as bridges were attacked from the air.)
The North Vietnamese lawyer specifically refers to article 8 of the
Nuremberg Charter and states that even though accused airmen have acted
strictly on orders given by their government or superiors, they remain
50See Report of the XXIst Conference of the Red Cross, Reaffirmation of the Laws and
Customs of Armed Conflict, Annex 1, p. 040.
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individually responsible for the air attacks. The lawyer writes that the
North Vietnamese Government "deliberately and clearsightedly ruled out
(protection for) those prosecuted and accused of war crimes and crimes
against mankind" in adhering to the Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention.
This is why, he concludes, U.S. pilots, whom he labels as pirates, sabo-
teurs and criminals, can be tried, and presumably punished, under the
North Vietnamese law of 20 January 1953, which he states relates to
crimes against the security of North Vietnam.
It was the unanimous opinion of the Secretary General and the ICRC
experts that even when airmen had committed acts justifying their treat-
ment as war criminals, they should be treated as prisoners-of-war. 51 Both
believed that an airman behind enemy lines, in distress, and not employing
any weapon should be protected from the civilian population. 52 Neither,
however, gave any significant attention to the relation of war crimes as
defined at Nuremberg and Tokyo to the conduct of air operations. In view
of the non-prosecution of any Axis airman or official for his part in air
activities, strategic bombing which by its nature is bound to cause a great
deal of suffering and devastation, must be judged on different grounds.
Certainly the impermissibility of the defense of superior orders has very
questionable application to air combat. The experts and the Secretary both
raised this issue in their report by stating that when the attack of the
military objective will cause serious loss to the civilian population, and is
disproportionate to the military advantage, they must refrain from the
attack. In recommending that the principles in U.N. Resolution 2444 be
introduced into army military instruction, especially for air forces, the
experts also state that this is "to remind all the members of the armed
forces that it is sometimes their duty to give priority to the requirements of
humanity, placing these before any contrary orders they might receive."
The airmen might properly ask how is he to know, flying off the wing of
his flight leader at 30,000 feet, at night, or over a solid covering of clouds,
whether the damage his bombs inflict will meet the test of proportionality
or his bombing will be indiscriminate. Or if he does exercise his individual
judgment on a particular raid, and refrains from the attack by leaving the
formation, what proof can he give when a charge is brought by his own
authorities for misbehavior before the enemy. It would seem that the
prosecutors and judges who presided at the War Crimes Trials in World
War 1I had such thoughts when they chose to refrain from the prosecution
of Axis airmen or officials for their participation in the conduct of air
campaigns.
5 1See Report of the ICRC Experts at 77.5 21d. at 78.
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Admittedly, the pilot of a tactical fighter plane or a helicopter who
performs his mission at low level and can identify clearly his individual
target, is more akin to the infantry rifleman. Professor Taylor has written
that the crews of helicopters and small reconnaissance planes who go
"squirrel hunting" for individuals, using machine guns and "sniping with
bombs," are "using the aircraft for the same purposes the infantryman uses
his gun" and ought to be judged by the same standards. 53 Certainly,
evidence that an airman deliberately singled out harmless non-combatants
or individual dwellings (not concealing military targets) could constitute a
war crime and result in a murder charge. Eight crewmen from two U.S.
Army helicopter gunships were charged late last year, either as principals
or accessories, to the deliberate killing or wounding of a number of Viet-
namese civilians by firing grenades from their craft along a rice field where
the Vietnamese were located. 54 Clearly, such conduct, if proved, falls
squarely within the parameters of Professor Taylor's remarks. 55 However,
the fundamental difference between the airman who is not charged with
such conduct and does not purposely single out and attack individual
civilians or defenseless homes, and the infantryman is clearly set forth in
the only War Crimes Trial to rule precisely on the subject of aerial bom-
bardment:
A city is bombed for tactical purposes; communications are to be de-
stroyed, railroads wrecked, factories razed, all for the purpose of impeding
the military. It inevitably happens that nonmilitary persons are killed. This is
an incident, a grave incident to be sure, but an unavoidable corollary of battle
action. The civilians are not individualized. The pilots take their aim at the
railroad yards, houses along the tracks are hit and many of the occupants are
killed, but this is entirely different in law and in fact from an armed force
marching up to these same railroad tracks, entering those houses abutting
thereon, dragging out the men, women, and children, and shooting them.56
These then are the three central dilemmas that impede the development
of the laws of air warfare. All past effort to define, by all-inclusive enu-
meration, those objectives which are proper military targets have failed.
Either they have been too restrictive or too indefinite to have been ac-
corded much respect in actual practice. General exhortations to refrain
from terror bombing, indiscriminate bombing and morale bombing equally
have a nebulous ring. There is no adequate standard to judge what con-
stitutes this type of warfare, and no nation has considered that their
53Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy 147.54Washington Post, May 3, 1971, p. 5.
55Cf. with report that in the Korean Conflict, UN Commanders authorized attack upon
civilians who were used as grenade and ammo carriers for the North Koreans. 6 Karig, Battle
Report (The War in Korea) (1952) p. 107.5 6Einsatz-Gruppen Case 4 Tr. War Crim. Cases 446-467.
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combatant air forces have ever resorted to the use of terror or in-
discriminate attacks.
The 1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property
signals a milestone, by providing agreement for the refuge of certain types
of objects and buildings. Perhaps this concept can be enlarged to immunize
other clearly defined resources and facilities of a belligerent nation. Com-
mon consent for the extension of hospital and safety zones to cover larger
segments of the civilian population, removed from vital target areas, also is
a growing possibility.
The dilemma of the choice of weapon is created by the uncertain status
of the use of nuclear force, the use of incendiaries, including napalm, in air
operations, and the use of modern agents designed to control the move-
ment of people without producing significant harm, and to destroy plants,
trees and food resources by chemical means. The applicability of the
Hague Regulations and the Geneva Gas Protocol to those forms of waging
war is far from settled, and in the eyes of some taints the aircrewman who
is detailed to employ them.
Finally, the status of the aircrewman, who all too frequently serves as
the focal point of the opposing belligerent's indignation and charges that
the laws of war have been violated, must be restated. It is the airman who
is especially vulnerable to mistreatment and denial of his rights under the
Geneva Convention of 1949, because of the tremendous destructive ca-
pacity within his control, and because he brings the misfortune of war to
the enemy hinterland. Clarification of the Nuremberg principles as they
apply to him, the airman, and withdrawal of reservations making possible
his treatment as a war criminal are badly needed. His legitimate combatant
status must be reaffirmed. That neither the weapons prescribed for his use,
nor the targets pre-selected for his particular mission, operate to remove
him from the ranks of lawful combatants must be recognized uniformly.
As difficult as these three central dilemmas make it to codify or formu-
late air law rules for armed conflict, the continued use of air power in
armed conflicts in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia make imperative
the issuance of concrete guidance for airmen of all armed forces. This
writer recently queried a responsible, knowledgeable Air Force lawyer as,
to whether the time was not at last propitious to update and promulgate the
Air Force rules of 1956- 1960 which never left the drafting stage. His
reply is worth quoting as a thoughtful argument against an Air Force
sponsored publication:
One of the real difficult problems in dealing with the laws of war is to take
an objective, legalistic analysis of what the law is and apply it to circum-
stances of today's conflict, bearing in mind that to a large extent International
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Law in this area is made by customary practices. Since the United States is
the one that is principally involved in the use of a wide variety of sophis-
ticated weapons, to assert restraint on the use of weapons not required by the,
current status of the law, yet demanded by certain segments of the in-
ternational community, is painful indeed. Such self-imposed restraint de-
signed to accommodate moral sensitivities, develop a customary rule of law
and yet win a war is an almost impossible task. I am almost of the view that
for the United States to participate in or to play an active role in the
development of the laws of war with respect to legality of weapons or tactics
is an almost impossibility while we are presently engaged in armed
conflict.5 7
Certainly, there is much merit in this viewpoint. The lack of any real,
distinctive guidance for the airman in the British and Swiss Manuals on the
laws of air warfare seems to support a view that codification of this subject
is premature, absent greater development of customary law. On the other
hand, neither the Secretariat of the United Nations, the General Assembly,
nor the International Committee of the Red Cross have thus far been
capable of working out a practical useful accommodation between oper-
ational (or military) necessity and the need for respect for human rights in
armed conflict.
Understandably, the efforts of the UN and the ICRC are directed
toward sparing the civilian population from the ravages of war. Human-
itarian admonitions by these agencies to refrain from terror bombing,
indiscriminate bombing, and the use of weapons which cause unnecessary
suffering or mass destruction carry great optative value. However, the Air
Force planner, the Wing Commander, his operations officer, and the crew-
men themselves relate much more strongly to Air Force doctrine in the
form of specific rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations become
part of the overall functioning of the military effort, in war as well as in
peace, and must be taken into account in mission counseling, briefing and
general Air Force instruction to aircrews and ground support members
alike. In contrast, it has to be admitted that such well intended efforts as
the ICRC rules of 1956 for the Limitation of the Dangers to the civilian
population can be of only peripheral significance to the airman and his
superiors until they are translated into concrete and detailed instructions
by Air Force or Defense publication.
In addition, the efforts of the ICRC and the UN Secretariat have a
utopian ring when they seek to eliminate area bombing, require the airman
to return with his bombs (presumably even in high level, all-weather bom-
bardment) if the target cannot be "duly identified"; and to make a selective
in-the-air choice as to the targets he will attack, based on the doctrine of
5 7Letter to the writer from an Air Force officer dated 13 April 1971.
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proportionality. Far better would it be for the Air Force to set forth its
position on these matters in specified, practical instructions in an Air Force
manual, pamphlet or regulation.
While the UN and the ICRC are naturally and primarily occupied with
the protection of the civilian population, the airman must be concerned
with many, many other limitations on the use of his aircraft and accom-
panying weapons in armed conflict. Does the Hague Rule requiring that
quarter be given to defenceless ground combatants, prohibit attacks on
disabled enemy aircraft? Does the Hague Rule requiring combatants to
wear "fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance" and to "carry
arms openly," have any applicability to the flying crewman? Is the de-
scending enemy crewman subject to attack? Is the crewman who carries
saboteurs and spies for air drop behind enemy lines tainted by this conduct
if captured? What is his status if he falls into enemy hands while on a
propaganda mission which has for its purpose the incitement of the enemy
to desert? May he attack non-military public aircraft of the enemy, or civil
enemy aircraft, and must his own aircraft bear national, belligerent mark-
ings, or may he adorn it with the markings of the enemy?
It is doubtful, indeed, that this and many other such important questions
will have been considered by the conference of Government experts which
is to convene at Geneva 24 May thru 12 June 1971, for the purpose of
reaffirming and developing the international humanitarian laws applicable
to armed conflicts. State and Defense representatives will have attended
this conference for the U.S., but if the past efforts of the ICRC are a
prelude to the future, this ICRC conference may not have solved the three
basic dilemmas confronting the Air Force in today's conflict, nor will they
have had the time needed to consider the many detailed, ancillary rules of
air warfare which so urgently need articulation today.
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